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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
AGENCY---"FAILY PURPOSE DOCTRIE"-A comparatively
recent and very popular means of transportation, the automobile, has
given rise to the doctrine, involving the laws of agency, known as
the "family purpose doctrine." The courts are at variance as to
whether this is a new application of old principles, or a change in the
interpretation of what constitutes a "father's business". In a recent
case, Ritter v. Hicks,' there was an action by the plaintiff, admini-
stratrix of the" deceased, against H. W. Hicks and his son I. R. for
damages for the death of her husband. I. R. was driving, at the time
of the accident, a car purchased for demonstration purposes in his
fathers business. In the lower court damages were awarded against
both defendants. On appeal the judgment was reversed and dismis-
sed as to the father, and affirmed as to the son. The court held: the
owner of an automobile purchased for demonstration and sale and
not for family use is not responsible under the "family purpose
doctrine" for a tort committed by his son while driving the automo-
bile. Neither is he liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
although the son was his agent in selling cars, when as in the instant
case the car was used after business hours and for the son's pleasure.
Some courts hold the father is liable in such a case on the theory
of respondeat superior,2 there being a tendency to treat the children
as servants, or as agents,3 in carrying out the father's business. They
hold that a parent makes it his affair by maintaining a family auto-
mobile for the use of the family. He owns the machine and has a
right to say where, how, and by whom it might be used, and
impliedly, if not expressly, authorizes its use (in the absence of an
express prohibition) at the time when accidents occur.4  "The
- (1926) W. Va. 135 S. E. 601.
2Jones v. Cook (1922) 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828. Stepdaughter driving
father's car. Owner held liable for injury caused to the plaintiff. The step-
daughter while so driving was acting in the furtherance of the owner's pur-
pose, i.e. maintaining the car for the pleasure and comfort of his family.
Decision not based on family or agency relationship.
'Davis v. Littlefield (1914) 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487. Plaintiff was in-
jured by the negligent driving of the defendant's car by the defendant's son.
The son habitually drove the car with his -father's consent, and at the time
of the accident was using it entirely for his own pleasure. Held that the
defendant is liable on the principles of agency. The 'family purpose doctrine"
obtains in Kentucky; see leading case of Stowe v. Morris (1912) 147 Ky. 386,
144 S. W. 52.
'Robertson v. Aldridge (1923) 185 N. C. 292, 116 S. E. 742.
[252 ]
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doctrine of agency is not confined to merely commercial business
transactions, but extends to cases where the father maintains an
automobile for family use, with general authority, express or implied,
that it may be used for the comfort, convenience, pleasure, and
entertainment or outdoor recreation of members of the owner's
family.5
In the case of Thixton v. Palmer- the plaintiff was struck by an
automobile owned by the defendant for her use and that of her son.
The son had taken the car, with the defendants permission, to go to
the theatre. When the accident happened a friend of the son, who
was neither related to the defendant nor had her permission to drive,
was driving negligently. Held: defendant liable. The Kentucky
court goes to the limit of this doctrine in the above case. The rea-
son for such decision was that the defendant would be liable for the
son's negligence and the son, being in control of the car, was negli-
fent in allowing his friend to drive negligently.
7
When the occupants of the car are members of the owners
family it is competent for the jury to infer that there was at least
an implied authority for such use.8 Some courts hold that if only
one occupant of the car is a member of the owners family the
doctrine does not apply,9 whereas it will apply if more than one are
in the car. This argument seems fallacious as it is as much within
the "general purpose of ownership that any member of the family
should use it, and the agency is present in the use of it by one, as
well as by all."'1
The North Carolina Court has not accepted the "family purpose"
doctrine, but rather bases its decisions strictly on the principles of
agency, holding the parent liable for injuries caused by the negligent
driving of his children only when it appears that the driver was
acting within the authority, express or implied, of the owner." And
refusing to hold the parent liable where it appears that there was
' Keedy's Cases on Agency, p. 187; Kayser v. Van Nest (1914) 125 Minn.
277, 146 N. W. 1091, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 970; Tyree v. Tudor (1922) 183
N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714; Davis v. Littlefield, supra, n. 3.
1 Thixton v. Palmer (1925) 210 Ky. 838, 276 S. W. 971.
'Moylo v. A. W. Scott Co. (1919) 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832. The
Minnesota court accepts the "family purpose" doctrine but will not extend
the owner's liability so as to include a "favorite employee."
" Denison v. McNorton (1916) 228 Fed. 401.
'Doran v. Thomsen (1921) 300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817.
1 Indiana Law Jour. 90.
Tyree v. Tudor, supra, n. 5.
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no authority or an express prohibition. 12 Any law changing such
liability should come from legislative action and not by drastic decis-
ions of the courts.
J. Wir.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOREIGN COMMERCE-STATE LAW
LICENSING SALE OF STEAMSHIP TICKETS-A Pennsylvania law
required that no person, other than a railway or steamship company,
should engage in the sale of steamship tickets or orders for trans-
portation without first obtaining a license, the fee being $50 yearly,
and filing a bond; the license to be revoked for fraud or misrepre-
sentation; every application for license to be published, and applicant
to give evidence of moral character and ability suitable for the busi-
ness, and .a list of at least three steamship companies for which he
:s acting.
Defendant was representing four steamship companies operating
transatlantic steamers, and he was given certificates by them which
he was required by law to keep posted. He received material-
account books and ticket books, etc.-and his commission was 25%
of the proceeds of sales.
Held, Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissenting, that this
statute is a direct interference with foreign commerce and is uncon-
stitutional.'
As the question whether a state regulation is an unlawful burden
upon interstate or foreign commerce is the most difficult problem
that arises under the commerce clause,2 and the cases being too num-
erous to be summarized here, we will examine only the cases which
the Court cites as being authority for the present holding.
Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co.8 held that solicitation of
traffic by railroads is a recognized part of interstate commerce. The
'Linville v. Nissen (1913) 162 N. C. 96, 77 N. E. 1096; 2 N. C. Law Rev.
178.
1Di Santo v. Pennsylvania (1927Y 47 Sup. Ct. 267.
' Black's Constitutional Law (3rd ed.) p. 219; Shafer v. Farmer's Grain
Co. (1925) 268 U. S. 189, 199, 45 Sup. Ct. 481; 69 L. Ed. 909.
'Davis v. Farmers' Codperative Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 315, 43 Sup. Ct.
556, 67 L. Ed. 996. A Minnesota statute provided that any foreign corpor-
ation having an agent in the state for purpose of soliciting traffic over its
lines outside the state could be served with summons by leaving a copy thereof
with the agent. This statute was construed by the state court as applying to
cases where plaintiff is not and never has been a citizen of Minnesota. This
was held unconstitutional as being a serious and unreasonable burden upon
interstate commerce.
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statute in the instant case, however, applied to persons "other than a
railroad or steamship company."
Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co.4 held that state regulation of the
buying of wheat for shipment outside the state was a direct inter-
ference with interstate commerce. But it might be noticed here that
Congress had passed a law on the subject,5 and the court found that
the state law went further than the national law on the subject.6
Hence the case is justified on the basis that the regulation was
invalid because Congress had acted.
The court states that the present case is controlled by Texas
Transport Co. v. New Orleans7 and McCall v. California.8 The
former involved a revenue measure, 9 while the present case concerns
a license fee, all of which was employed in regulating the business;
in the case of McCall v. California, a license tax of $25 per quarter
was imposed on railroad agents in California who solicited traffic
over interstate railroads. But in the McCall case defendant was
agent of a railroad, while the instant statute does not apply-to rail-
road or steamship companies.
In Real Silk Mills v. Portland'° a statute imposed a license tax
of $12.50 quarterly upon agents on foot and $25 on agents with
vehicles who went from place to place taking orders for future
delivery, where a deposit or payment was required in advance. The
dissenting opinion in the present case distinguishes it from the Port-
land case on the ground that in the latter the statute discriminated
against interstate and foreign commerce. This point is difficult to
" Shafer v. Farmers" Grain Co., note 2, above. Here a North Dakota
statute, stating its purpose to be the prevention of frauds, prohibited buying
of wheat by grade unless the buyer produced a state grading license, and,
among. other things, gave bond securing payment for all wheat so purchased
and for complying with all state regulations. The state each year sent outside
125,000,000 bushels of wheat, or 90% of the total output. Held to be a direct
interference with interstate commerce.
'U. S. Grain Standards Act (Comp. St. sec. 8747y--87473/ 2k).
'Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1925) 268 U. S. 189, 202, 45 Sup. Ct. 481,
69 L. Ed. 909.
'Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans (1924) 264 U. S. 150, 44 Sup. Ct.
242, 68 L. Ed. 611, 34 A. L. R. 907.
McCall v. California (1890) 136 U. S. 104, 10 Sup. Ct. 881, 34 L. Ed. 391.
'The statute in Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans imposed a license tax,
graduated according, to the amount of business done, on companies acting as
agents for certain steamship companies exclusively engaged in interstate com-
merce.
'Real Silk Mills v. Portland (1925) 268 U. S. 325, 336, 45 Sup. Ct. 525,
69 L. Ed. 982.
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see, as the statute in the Portland case evidently applied as well to
intrastate as to interstate and foreign sellers of goods.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the Di Santo
case, with which Mr. Justice Holmes concurs, says that the McCall
case, supra, is distinguishable on its facts, and that if it is not so
distinguishable it may be disregarded without encroaching upon the
doctrine of stare decisis, that doctrine not requiring that the court
make the same mistake twice when different statutes are being con-
strued, and he urges the disregard of the McCall case.
It appears that all the cases which the court cites as sustaining
its holding can be distinguished on their facts, although in some
instances the line of demarcation is narrow. The multiplicity of
cases on this subject have necessarily somewhat confused the appli-
cation of the rules determining when a state law is an unlawful
burden on interstate or foreign commerce." For this reason each case
must depend on its own facts in determining to which class it belongs.
Here the regulation was aimed at preventing fraud by those who
sell tickets,12 and did not apply to railroad and steamship lines.
Since Congress has not acted on that particular subject, it seems that
the court could have held the regulation valid without reversing any
of its former decisions on the subject. Such regulations have been
held valid by many of the state courts.13
S-. E. VEST.
"The decisions of this court respecting the validity of state laws chal-
lenged under the commerce clause have established many rules covering various
situations. Two of these rules are specially invoked here-one that a state
statute enacted for admissible state purposes and which affects interstate
commerce only incidentally and remotely is not a prohibited state regulation
in the sense of that clause; and the other, that a state statute which by its
necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens such commerce is a
prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was
enacted. These rules, although readily understood and entirely consistent, are
occasionally difficult of application, as where a state statute closely approaches
the line which separates one rule from the other. As might be expected, the
decisions dealing with such exceptional situations have not been in full accord.
Otherwise the course of adjudications has been consistent and uniform." Shafer
v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1925) 268 U. S. 189, 199, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed.
909.
, See Commonwealth v. Keary (1901) 198 Pa. 500, 48 Atd. 472, for dis-
cussion of the evils perpetrated by ticket brokers and scalpers in Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Keary (1901) 198 Pa. 500, 48 Atl. 472; Burdick v.
People (1894) 149 Ill. 600, 36 N. E. 948, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329, 24 L. R. A.
152; s. c. 149 Ill. 611, 36 N. E. 952; Fry v. Stale (1878) 63 Ind. 552, 30 Am.




To PRACTIcE DENTISTRY-In a recent Minnesota case' the plaintiff
was refused license to practice dentistry in that state because he was
unable to produce a diploma from some dental college of good stand-
ing when he applied for license as required by statute.2 He was
convicted of practicing dentistry without license. The single question
presented on appeal was whether the statute requiring an applicant
to produce a diploma is constitutional. Held, that the statute was not
unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, nor violative of the due pro-
cess clause or other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution. The state, through the legislature, is primarily
the judge of regulations required in the interest of safety and
public welfare, and the validity of a police statute will be upheld so
long as it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Obviously the fact that
an applicant has a diploma has a direct and substantial relation to
his qualification to practice dentistry. The decision is in harmony
with the holdings in other state courts involving the validity of
statutes regulating the qualifications to practice professions which
require a high degree of scientific learning.3
C. W. HALL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CITIZENS OF STATE-In the recent case of Florida v. Mellon et
al. (1927) 47 S. Ct. 265, the state of Florida sought leave to file a
bill of complaint against the defendants to enjoin the collection in
Florida of inheritance taxes under the federal Revenue Act. The
complaint alleged that under the Constitution of Florida no inheri-
tance tax could be levied by the state; that according to this act of
Congress' the estates of decedents which had been taxed by the
states were given a graduated per centum credit up to 80% ; that
this was discrimination against Florida's citizens and detrimental to
the state as tending to take money therefrom.
Held: that Florida could not maintain the action on the ground of
injury to its citizens as parens patriae, for the citizens of Florida are
Graves v. State of Minnesota (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122.
'Gen. Laws, 1889, c. 19, and amendments embodied in Gen. Stats. 1923,
sects. 5757-5763.
'In re Thompson (1904) 36 Wash. 377, 78 Pac. 899; State v. Green (1887)
112 Ind. 462, 14 N. E. 352; State v. Creditor (1890) 44 Kan. 563, 24 Pac. 346;
People v. Phippin (1888) 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. 888.
'Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 69, 70.
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also citizens of the United States, and the laws of the United States
made in pursuance of the Constitution are the supreme law of the
land, the law of Florida to the contrary nothwithstanding;2 nor
could the state maintain the suit on the ground of discrimination
against her, for the law is uniform in the sense that by its provisions
the rule of liability shall be alike in all parts of the United States.8
GEo. ROUNTREE, JR.
CONTRACTs-LIABILITY OF INFANT FOR INDUCING CONTRACT
BY MISREPRESENTING AGE-In Meyers v,. Hurley Motor Co. (1926)
47 Sup. Ct. 277, the plaintiff, an infant, representing himself to be
24 years of age, purchased an automobile from defendant under a
conditional sales contract. The plaintiff made payments amounting
to $400, and then being in default, the defendant repossessed the car.
The plaintiff now disaffirms the contract and sues to recover the
$400 paid to defendant, who, in turn, sets up a counterclaim for
$500, the amount necessary to repair the car and put it in the con-
dition it was at the time of sale to the plaintiff. Hard and abusive
usuage of the car by the plaintiff was alleged.
The case was certified to the Supreme Court upon the following
questions: (1) Is the plaintiff, because of his misrepresentation,
estopped from maintaining this action? (2) If not, may defendant
set off the amount paid for repair of car, as an affirmative defense,
or only so much as will equal plaintiff's claim.
The court answered the first question in the negative, holding
that the doctrine of estoppel in pais does not apply to an infant. As
to the second question, it was held that the defendant was entitled
to its affirmative defense, it being, in effect, tortious conduct. But
the defendant was not entitled to the excess of its claim over that of
plaintiff, since relief was by way of recoupment, that is, "defendant's
damage can be allowed only in abatement or diminution of plain-
tiff's claim, and that defendant cannot, at least in that action, recover
any excess." The result is equitable. The infant is allowed the
right to disaffirm his contracts, and, if he has not tortiously damaged
the property, to receive back what he has paid. But the other party
is protected to the extent of the damage done to the property by the
'Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
606; Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447.
' Consti. Art. 1, s. 8, c. 1.
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tortious conduct of the infant. The North Carolina decisions on
this subject have been discussed in 3 N. C. L. Rev. 110-127.
W. H. ABERNATHY.
CRIMINAL LAW-FRAUDULENT USE OF MALs-The case of
Fasulo v. United States (1926) 47 S. Ct. Rep. 200, decides that the
use of the mails for the purpose of obtaining money by means of
threats of murder and bodily harm is not an offense embraced by
section 215 of the Criminal Code [35 Stat. 1088, 1130 (Comp. St.
sec. 10385)] making it criminal to use the mails for transmitting any
"scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or prom-
ises." The court disagreed with the government's contention that
the statute embraces the using of the mails to obtain money by any
dishonest means: "Broad as are the words 'to defraud', they do not
include threat and coercion through fear or force."
The holding is based on the strict construction of penal statutes,
and the common usage and ordinary meaning of language.
S. E. VEST.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-PRIOR INSANITY AS A DEFENSE-
In the recent case of State v. Jones,1 the defendant was found guilty
of murder in the firse degree and appealed, alleging as error the
refusal of the court to instruct the jury that as the defendant was
declared insane by the state prison physician of Connecticut three or
four years previously, such insanity was presumed to continue, and
the burden was on the state to prove the "defendant's sanity at the
time of the homicide by the preponderance of the evidence. The
conviction was sustained there being no error.
Insanity, when pleaded as a defense in a criminal action, is an
affirmative plea and must be proved by the defendant to the satis-
faction of the jury.2 The declaration of the state prison physician
is not sufficient to raise a presumption that the defendant was insane,
and rid him of the burden of its proof.
In view of the prevalent practice of those who are being tried
for violations of the criminal law to claim insanity in an effort to
1State v. Jones (1926) 191 N. C. 753, 133 S. E. 81.
'State v. Terry (1917) 173 N. C. 761, 92 S. E. 154; State v. Spivey (1903)
132 N. C. 898, 43 S. E. 475; State v. Payne (1882) 86 N. C. 609.
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escape the consequence of their acts, the Supreme Court seems to
have acted wisely in refusing to accept a rule making it easier for
the defendant to set up insanity as a defense. The purpose of the
trial, when insanity is raised, is to determine the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the commission of the crime. Consequently
his previous condition should be permitted only as evidence. 8
The case of State v. Vann4 laid down the rule that though the
prosecution conceded the insanity of the defendant a short time
prior to the homicide, they contended that the defendant was sane
at the time of the homicide, and that if the defendant was to avail
himself of insanity the burden was on him to prove it to the satis-
faction of the jury. This case is approved and followed by subse-
quent North Carolina cases. 5 The rule is followed in other juris-
dictions also. 6 There are some jurisdictions which hold that if any
reasonable doubt is raised as to the defendant's sanity he should not
be convicted. 7 This rule does not seem to be desirable and is not
followed in North Carolina, for in the case of State v. Hancock,8
the defendant was found guilty of murder, but the jury said there
was some doubt as to his sanity and asked for mercy; yet, the con-
viction was sustained.
In the principal case the defendant's insanity was described as
"dementia praecox of the paranoid type" by Dr. Anderson, of the
state prison at Raleigh. But, as Judge Connor said in the opinion,
"The physician looks after the individual's interest, and his duty is
to protect the individual and others by his isolation and confinement
only; the courts, however, are required to act upon the philosophy
underlying the right and duty of the state to punish offenders against
the laws, and thus not only undertake the reformation of the
offender but also to endeavor to deter others from the commission
of crime by fear of like punishment." The defendant's sanity was
'State v. Cooper (1915) 170 N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50; Pflueger v. State
(1895) 64 N. W. 1094, 46 Neb. 493; Cochran v. State (1913) 61 So. 187, 65
Fla. 91.
'State v. Vann (1880) 82 N. C. 631.
'State v. Terry and State v. Spivey, see n. 2 supra; State v. Cooper n. 3
supra.
0 Wheeler v. State (1878) 34 Ohio St. 394, 32 Am. St. Rep. 372; People v.
Schmitt (1895) 106 Cal. 48, 39 Pac. 204; State v. Quigley (1904) 26 R. I.
263, 58 Atl. 905. 3 Ann. Cas. 920.
YMatheson v. U. S. (1913) 227 U. S. 540; Davis v. U. S. (1895) 160 U. S
469; !4dair v. State (1911) 6 Okla. Crim. Rep. 284, 118 Pac. 416, 44 L. R. A
(N. S.) 119.
'State v. Hancock (1908) 151 N. C. 699, 66 S. E. 137.
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sufficient to obtain his release from the Insane Asylum of Connecti-
cut, and at most his confinement to the asylum could be considered
by the jury only along with other evidence of insanity.9
M. P. MYERS.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRIAL-WAIVER OF RIGHT TO BE PRS-
ENT-It seems there is no uniform rule which governs the various
jurisdictions in determining when a person accused of crime may
waive the right to be present throughout the trial. In the recent
Georgia case of Swain v. State,' the defendant was on trial for
murder, and after all the evidence had been taken, the prosecuting
attorney made a request joined in by the defendant's counsel that the
jury be taken to the scene of the murder to see the circumstances
under which it was committed. The defendant was present and
raised no objection. Two officers were appointed by the court to
escort the jury, and they viewed the scene unaccompanied by the
defendant, his counsel, or the judge. After a verdict of first degree
murder the defendant appealed on the ground that his constitutional
rights had been violated. Held, that the defendant waived his right
to be with the jury at the scene of the crime.
In a recent North Carolina case2 on the same subject the defen-
dant was on trial for first degree murder and after all the evidence
had been taken and the jury had retired for deliberation the judge's
attention was called to an error in the charge; he thereupon asked
the defendant and his counsel to accompany him to the jury room to
give the correct charge. They assured him that it was all right for
him to go alone. He stepped to the door of the jury room and gave
the correct charge. A verdict of second degree murder was rendered
and the defendant appealed on the ground that he was entitled to
a new trial because he could not waive his right to be present
throughout the trial of a capital case. The court said that if there
was any error committed it was cured by the verdict of second
degree murder (not capital).
The Georgia case is in line with previous decisions of that juris-
diction, which hold that the right to 'be present during the trial is for
the defendant's benefit, and he can waive this right even in capital
SWigmore's Evid., section 233.
"Swain v. State (1926) Ga., 135 S. E. 187.
2State v. Hardee (1926), 192 N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345.
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cases.3 The waiver may be made expressly by defendant, or by his
counsel in his presence, the defendant raising no objections, or
where he voluntarily absents himself during the trial. This right
cannot be waived by counsel alone. And the court is very careful
to see that the defendant's right to be present is not violated by
proceeding in his absence without his consent.
4
There is some authority to the effect that the inspection by the
jury of the scene of the crime is not within itself a part of the trial
when there are no witnesses, parties to the suit, or judge with
them.5 This seems to be very logical and desirable, for the evidence
is brought out at the trial, and the purpose of the inspection is not
to get more evidence but merely to enable the jury to understand the
evidence they have. But in the case of Chance v. State,6 the court
reversed a verdict of guilty of a capital felony on the ground that
the defendant's right to be present was violated when the jury was
taken to the scene of the crime for inspection without the defen-
dant's consent.
If the principal Georgia case had been decided in North Carolina
a new trial would have been given, for in North Carolina the rule
is that in trial for a capital felony a defendant cannot waive his
right to be present at every stage of the trail.7 But as to felonies
less than capital the North Carolina rule is the same as the Georgia
rule, and in view of this fact the decision of the principal North
Carolina case is correct.8 The defendant would have been entitled
to a new trial had he been found guilty of first degree murder, but
there was no violation of his rights when the verdict was for second
degree murder (not a capital case), and he had waived his right to be
present.
'Cawthon v. State (1904) 119 Ga. 395, 46 S. E. 897; Baldwin v. Stite
(1912) 138 Ga. 349, 75 S. E. 324; Frank v. State (1914) 142 Ga. 741, 645.
"Lyons v. State (1909) 7 Ga. App. 50, 66 S. E., 149; Vanderford v. State
(1906) 126 Ga. 753, 55 S. E. 1025; Denson v. State (1923) 150 Ga. 618, 104
S. E. 780; Mills v. State (1918) 23 Ga. App. 14, 97 S. E. 408.
'People v. Thorn (1898) 156 N. Y. 285, 50 N. E. 947, 42 L. R A. 368;
State v. Sing (1924) 114 Ore. 267, 229 Pac.. 921.
Chance v. State (1923) 156 Ga. 428, 119 E. E. 303.
'State v. Blackwelder (1866) 61 N" C. 39; State v. Jenkins (1881) 84
N. C. 814; State v. Dry (1910) 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000.
'State v. Bray (1872) 67 N. C. 283; State v. Kelly (1887) 97 N. C. 404,
2 S. E. 185; State v. Austin (1891) 108 N. C. 786, 13 S. E. 219; State v.
Mitchell (1896) 119 N. C. 784, 25 S. E. 783; State v. Harstfield (1924) 188
N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629.
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The prevailing rule is that a defendant has the right to be pre-
sent at the trial of any felony, 9 but the authorities are not uniform
as to the power of the defendant to waive this right. Some juris-
dictions hold that a defendant must be present at every stage of a
capital felony,' 0 and he cannot waive his presence; others hold that
the same rule applies to all felonies;"3 while the majority hold that
in trials of felonies less than capital the defendant may waive any
right he has to be present.'
2
There seems to be little reason why a defendant should not be
able to waive his right to be present during the trial of a capital
felony. Perhaps the rule is based on custom and policy at a time
when a person accused of crime stood in need of every protection.
Today, when defendants are surrounded by so many safeguards, it
seems reasonable to allow a defendant to waive his presence at a trial
under proper supervision of the court.
M. P. MYERS.
DAMAGES-ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-EXCESSIVE VER-
DIcT-Action was brought by the wife of deceased under section
8069, Barnes' Federal Code, 35 Stat. 65 (UI. S. Comp. Stat. 8657),
for the benefit of herself and their two children, aged five and two
respectively, for the wrongful death and the pain and suffering of
her husband. The deceased was an engineer on defendant's train,
aged 42, in good health, and, within three year period prior to his
death, had earned $450 per month, two-thirds of which he had de-
voted to maintenance of his wife and children. Deceased suffered in-
tense pain for fifteen days and was conscious to the very end. The
jury awarded a verdict and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for
$53,750. Held, not excessive. Looney v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co., 135 S. E. 262 (W. Va.-1926).
According to the Carlisle Mortality Tables, Looney's life expect-
ancy was 26 years. The average earnings of the deceased during
the last three years were $4500, two-thirds of which would be $3,000,
'8 PL C. L., p. 94, par. 53.
" Sherrod v. State (1908) 93 Miss. 774, 47 So. 554; Holton v. State (1849)
2 Fla. 500; Scott v. State (1925) 113 Neb. 657, 204 N. W. 381; State v. Reed
(1922) 65 Mont. 51, 210 Pac. 756.
'Summeralls v. State (1896) 37 Fla. 162, 20 So. 242, 53 A. S. P. 247;
State v. McCau.sland (1918) 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 934; Noell v. Common-
wealth (1923) 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679.
'-'16 C. J. 817.
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which was devoted to the support of his wife and children. The
investment required to provide an annuity of $3,000 at 4% for 26
years would be $47,948.40. The award of the jury for pain and
suffering therefore was only $5,801.60. It was on this basis that the
jury fixed the damages. The court says that in absence of any
record that the verdict was affected by bias, prejudice, partiality on
the part of the jury, or was based on some wrong theory or in
violation of some rule of law, it is the duty of the appellate court
not to invade the province of the jury in their right to fix the amount
of damages.
C. R. JONAS.
EVIDENCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--TREsPAss AB INITIO WHERE
LIQUOR WRONGFULLY DEsTROYE--ADmISSIBILITY OF PART OF
LIQUOR IN EVnENcE-Federal officers under a search warrant
entered the premises of the appellant, seized a quantity of liquor and,
without a court order, destroyed all except one quart which was
saved for evidence. The whiskey was admitted in evidence over the
objection of the appellant that, by reason of the unwarranted destruc-
tion, the officers were trespassers ab initio, and that, therefore, the
seizure was unlawful under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and its admission in evidence prohibited by the
fifth. Held, the whiskey' was properly admitted in evidence.
McGuire v. United States (1927) 47 S. Ct. 259.
In 1885 the United States Supreme Court swerved from the
established precedents of a century, to the effect that evidence other-
wise admissible is not rendered inadmissible because it was unlaw-
fully obtained,' and declared in the Boyd case2 that as a consequence
of the fourth amendment, evidence obtained by an unwarranted
search was inadmissible at the trial.8 The same court in the Adams
case,4 decided in 1904, changed its opinion and admitted in evidence
documents seized by officers noihwithstanding the rights of the prop-
'Bishop Atterbury's Trial (1723) 16 How. St. Tr. 495; Legatt v. Tollervey
(1811) 14 East 302; Chastening v. State (1887) 83 Ala. 29, 3 So. 304; Com-
monwealth v. Dana (Mass.) 2 Metc. 329; Scott v. State (1897) 113 Ala. 64,
21 So. 425; Williams v. State (1897) 11 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624; Gindrat v.
The People (1891) 138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. 1085; State v. Atkinson (1893) 40
S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021.
'Boyd v. United States (1885) 116 U. S. 616.
'Supra, n. 2.
'Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585.
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erty holder had been invaded and the search conducted without a
warrant.5 Ten years later in the Weeks case 6 the court squarely
repudiated that position, harking back to the Boyd case, 7 and held
that such evidence will be excluded; with the qualification, however,
that the defendant must move the court to exclude the same and
return to him before the trial or at the first opportunity after the
movant gets notice of the illegal seizure.8 But the provision of the
fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
only to governmental action, and evidence, though illegally secured by
private individuals, or even by state officers,9 and turned over to the
government prosecutor, in the absence of collusion between them,
will be admitted.10 Does the decision of the instant case indicate
that the Federal Supreme Court is inclining again to the position it
assumed prior to the Boyd case" and preparing to "switch back" to
the Adams' 2 position? The actual decision clearly does not go that
far,'8 but the dictum of Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote the opinion
in the case, would lead one to suppose so. He said: "A criminal
prosecution is more than a game in which the government may be
checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not
played according to the rules."
The weight of state authority is to the effect that property
obtained 'by an unwarranted seizure is nevertheless admissible.14 This
view was espoused by Greenleaf15 and has been warmly defended by
Wigmore, who maintains very forcibly that admissibility of evidence
should be determined by its inherent probative value, and without
'Supra, n. 4.
'Weeks v. United Stateg (1914) 232 U. S. 383.
Supra, n. 2.
'Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920) 251 U. S. 385; Gouled
v. United States (1921) 255 U. S. 298.
'Crawford v. United States (1925) 5 Fed. (2nd) 672; Klein v. United
States (1926) 14 Fed. (2nd) 35.
" Burdean v. McDowell (1921) 256 U. S. 465.
u Supra, n. 2.
" Supra, n. 4.
1 Since the entry and the seizure of the liquor produced did not violate the
constitutional provisions, but the only unlawful act was the extraneous act
of destruction.
"' Hall v. Commonwealthl (Va.-1924) 121 S. E. 154; Commonwealth v.
Wilkins (Mass.-1923) 138 N. E. 13; People v. Mayen (Cal.-1922) 205 Pac.
437; Shields v. State (Ala.-1894) 16 So. 85; Williams v. State (G&.-1897) 28
S. E. 627; State v. Prescott (S. C.-1923) 117 S. E. 637.
1 Greenleaf, Evoidence, sec. 254 A.
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regard to the collateral issue, how obtained. 16 The favored reasoning
of the state courts which adhere to this view is that as the unreason-
able search and seizure, which is forbidden by the constitution, is
already consummated before the evidence is offered at the trial, the
two actions are separate and distinct. The constitutional guarantee
of a man to be secure in his person and home is already invaded
before the evidence is offered, and there must be a remedy for that
invasion whether the invader returns the property, destroys it, sells
it, or uses it in evidence in the trial of an action against the invadee.
To exclude the evidence is no remedy for the act complained of.
The logical and proper remedy would seem to be an action against
the invading officer. In that view of the situation, thi person whose
home has been broken into and whose property has been summarily
seized, is left to his civil remedy against the officer. This is
obviously an inadequate remedy which virtually renders the con-
stitutional guarantee nugatory, say the courts which exclude the
evidence.
17
North Carolina is universally cited as following the majority
view, and that is the apparent line of decision in the decided cases.1 8
Our cases, however, place great reliance upon the Adams case,19
notwithstanding the doctrine in that case has been virtually repudi-
ated.20 Probably it is safe to say, from the paucity of decisions and
this dependance upon the Adams case, that the future course of
the North Carolina decisions on this point is not determined.
C. R. JONAS.
FEDERAL COURTS - JURISDICTION - REINCORPORATION IN
ANOTHER STATE TO OBTAIN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-In a recent
case, the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation authorized to carry on
a general transfer business, not only in Tennessee, but in other states.
The plaintiff had previously been a Kentucky corporation, and, while
carrying on its general transfer business there, contracted with the
"4 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2183-84.
1125 Col. Law Review 11; Young v. Commonwealth (Ky.-1920) 224 S. W.
860; Tucker v. State (Miss.-1922) 90 So. 845; State v. Willis (W. Va.-1922)
114 S. E. 261; Hughes v. State (Tenn.-1922) 238 S. W. 588.
'State v. Wallace (1913) 162 N. C. 622, 78 S. E. 1; State v. Fowler (1916)
172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408; State v. Simmons (1922) 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E.
591.
Supra, n. 4.
Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383.
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L. & N. Railroad Company for the exclusive privilege, "in so far as
the railroad company can legally grant it", of soliciting the hauling
of baggage and passengers in and around the railway terminal, with
the further privilege of having an agent in the waiting room and
a designated parking space. The defendant carried on a general
transfer business in competition with plaintiff, refused to recognize
the plaintiff's exclusive contract and violated the same. The rail-
road company did nothing to prevent such violation.
The defendant was justified in its conduct under the law of
Kentucky, as set out in the decision of the state courts, that a com-
mon carrier cannot grant to any one person the exclusive privilege of
hauling passengers and baggage from its stations.' On the other
hand, the federal courts follow a different rule, that, when the con-
tract is not unnecessary, unreasonable or arbitrary, a railroad may
grant such exclusive privileges, in the absence of valid state legis-
lation prohibiting the same. In the federal court view, such an
exclusive arrangement is not a monopoly nor an improper use by the
railroad company of its property.
2
Upon the violation of its exclusive contract by the defendant,
the Kentucky corporation was dissolved according to law and rein-
corporated in Tennessee with the same name, incorporators and
stockholders. The property of the Kentucky corporation was turned
over to the Tennessee corporation, which, however, had no property
in Tennesee and did no business there.
Having perfected its incorporation in Tennessee, the plaintiff filed
its bill in this case, alleging a diversity of citizenship and conceding
that its acts of dissolving and reincorporating in another state were
"for protection in this or any controversy that might arise out of
this contract or any other." Defendant's motion to dismiss, for
the reason that the contract was void under Kentucky law and that
the plaintiff's conduct (dissolving in Kentucky and reincorporating
in Tennessee) for the purpose of bringing suit in the federal courts
was fraudulent, was overruled, and the plaintiff was successful in
both the district court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. Black and
White Taxi Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi Co. (1926) 15 Fed. (2d.)
509.
'McConnell v. Pedigo (1892) 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15; Palmer Transfer
Co. v. Anderson (1909) 131 Ky. 217, 115 S. W. 182; Commonwealth v. Louis-
ville Transfer Co. (1918) 181 Ky. 305, 204 S. W. 92.
'Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co. (1905) 199 U. S. 279, 295 et seq., 26 5. Ct.
91, 50 L. Ed. 192.
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The fact that the state court follows one rule on a point of gen-
eral or commercial law does not prevent a federal court from adher-
ing to another. Both state and federal courts sitting in Kentucky
are courts of that jurisdiction and administer Kentucky law. It
happens that they have different appellate tribunals. So each court
is entitled to say what the law of its jurisdiction (Kentucky) is.8
The federal courts consider principles of the common law and find
that such a contract as that involved in this case is perfectly valid.
The state courts reach the opposite conclusion. Aside from the
argument of convenience, such a result seems to be satisfactory.
And, where in addition, the point has been previously ruled upon by
one of the national courts, as in this case, the federal courts will
follow that ruling.4 Therefore, though the contract would have
been held void by the state courts in Kentucky, when the federal
court gained jurisdiction, it recognized the rights of the plaintiff
under the contract and gave relief accordingly.
Clearly, the suit involves a substantial controversy. The fact that
the plaintiff preferred to bring his litigation in the federal courts
instead of in the state courts is not wrongful so long as no improper
act was done by which the jurisdiction of the federal court was
obtained.5 The motive does not affect the right to sue if there is a
diversity of citizenship and if the conveyance to the corporation is a
real transaction as distinguished from a fictitious one.6 The decisive
question, according to the court, is whether the Tennessee corpora-
tion is real or fictitious, so that it may or may not be dealt with
as a citizen of Tennessee. The reality of the corporation does not
not depend on the motive which occasioned it.7 In this case, the
conduct of the plaintiff's business was to be continued as a Ten-
nessee corporation, according to the stated intention of one of the in-
corporators. In the absence of such a statement, dissolution of a cor-
poration being equivalent to death of a natural person,8 the dissolu-
' Swift v. Tyson (1842) 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 65; Community Building Co.
v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1925) 8 Fed. (2d) 678.
"In re Jarmulouskey (1918) 249 Fed. 319, 161 C. C. A. 327; Railroad Co.
v. National Bank (1880) 102 U. S. 14, 26 L. Ed. 61 reaffirming Swift v. Tyson,
note 3 supra.
*In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership (1908) 208 U. S. 90, 111, 28 S. Ct.
219, 225, 52 L. Ed. 403.
7Lehigh Mining etc. Co. v. Kelly (1895) 160 U. S. 327, 332, 333, 16 S. Ct.
307, 40 L. Ed. 444.
'Barney v. Baltimore (1867) 6 Wall. 280, 18 L. Ed. 225; Lehigh Mining
etc. Co. v. Kelly, note 6 supra.
" Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film Co. (1915) 244 Fed. 985.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
tion in Kentucky is prima fade evidence of the intention to continue
to conduct the business as a Tennessee corporation. After dissolu-
tion, the corporation is not capable of being sued or of suing in the
corporate name.9 Neither is there any corporation left in Kentucky
to which to compel a reconveyance of the corporate property after
the suit has been successfully prosecuted by the Tennessee corpora-
tion, as in Lehigh Mining Co. v. Kelly.1 In that case, the stock-
holders of a Virginia corporation caused the incorporation of another
corporation in Pennsylvania and conveyed land to it for purpose of
having litigation concerning the land brought in the federal courts.
The suit was not allowed, as the Virginia corporation had not been
dissolved. The property of the corporation, including rights on con-
tracts and choses in action, upon dissolution became vested in the
stockholders, subject to the rights of creditors of the corporation."
When these assets were sold to the Tennessee corporation, the latter
became owner of the right of action on the contract in controversy
and could alone bring suit thereon.12 The recognition of the Ten-
nessee corporation as an entity does not allow the perpetration of
fraud or the accomplishment of an unlawful act, and therefore, the
case seems correctly decided.
W. H. ABERNATHY.
JUDGMENTS-SETTING JUDGMENT ASIDE FOR EXCUSABLE NEG-
LECT-In the recent North Carolina case of Helderman v. Mills Co.'
the cause of action originally arose out of an alleged breach of con-
tract. Summons was duly served on the defendant, and a com-
plaint filed against him. Neither demurrer nor answer was filed
within the time allowed by statute2 and defendant made no request
for an extension of time within which to file an answer. On October
26, 1925, upon motion by plaintiffs, judgment was rendered against
the defendant by default. On December 14, 1925, defendant
appeared for the first time and moved that the judgment be set
'Sharp v. Eagle Lake Lumber Co. et al. (1923) 60 Cal. App. 386, 212 Pac.
933; Plats v. International Smelting Co. (1923) 61 Utah 342, 213 Pac. 187.
" Note 6 supra.
'Smyth v. Kenwood Land Co. (1920) 97 Ore. 19, 190 Pac. 962; 3 Cook,
Corporations, par. 641.
" Baker-Matthews Mfg. Co. v. Grayling Lumber Co. (1918) 134 Ark. 351,
203 S. W. 1021.
'Helderman v. Mills Co. (1926) 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627.
2 C. S. 476.
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aside, and that he be given time within which to file an answer,
assigning as grounds for the motion, inter alia, that defendant's
failure to answer within the time prescribed by law was due to its
excusable neglect, and that defendant has a meritorious defense both
in law and in fact. The clerk's order allowing the motion was
affirmed by the Superior Court judge, and upon appeal to the
Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed. It was found as a fact
that by the terms of the contract, plaintiffs were not to ship certain
articles which defendant had bought until defendant requested it;
that plaintiffs shipped the articles without any request from defen-
ant and defendant declined to accept them; further that, upon
service of summons, defendant immediately retained an attorney
well known for his high character and professional standing to
defend the action, and authorized him to employ a local lawyer to
assist in the defense; that the attorney not being well himself and
being greatly distressed by the continued illness of his only son
failed to employ a local attorney or to take any steps toward defend-
ing the action. The court held that defendant had a right to assume
that the attorney would advise it when and what action was required
for making its defense and hence its neglect was excusable.
By statute a judge shall "upon such terms as may be just, at any
time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a
judgment, order, verdict, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect.
. It was under this statute that the defendant in the instant
case was given relief. This statute is highly remedial and is in har-
mony with the policy of the code states in looking at the substance and
merits of the case rather than allowing a miscarriage of justice
because of a mere lack of form or other technicality. Many other
states have similar statutes.
4
Did this statute excuse the defendant for its delay in the
principal case? It must not only appear that defendant's neglect
was excusable but also that it had a meritorious defense,5 and the
burden of showing these is on the applicant for relief. 6 The facts
' C. S. 600.
"Cal. Code Civ. Pro., sec. 473; Col. Rev. Code, sec. 81; S. C. Code Civ.
Pro. 1912. sec. 225.
'Land Co. v. Wooten (1919) 177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706; White v. White
(1920) 179 N. C. 592, 103 S. E. 216; Lumber Co. v. Cottingham (1917) 173
N. C. 323, 92 S. E. 9.
" Garner v. Quakenbush (1924) 188 N. C. 180, 124 S. E. 154.
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as found by the Superior Court judge are conclusive and are not
reviewable,7 but whether the facts found make a case of excusable
neglect is a question of law and is reviewable.8 It seems clear that
the defendant in the instant case has prima facie a meritorious
defense. If defendant was bound to make a request for shipment
of the articles bought of plaintiffs within a reasonable time, and
plaintiffs shipped without request before a reasonable time had
elapsed then plaintiffs could not recover. Only a prima facie meri-
torious defense is required to be shown.9 As to whether defendant's
neglect is excusable the test is whether he acted as a man of ordinary
prudence,' 0 i.e., would a man of ordinary prudence assume that his
attorney, who is known for his high character and professional
standing, would advise him when and what action was required of
him for making his defense?
Obviously the relationship of attorney and client is more than a
mere principal and agent relationship. It is a relation of specific
trust and confidence, and it is the duty of the attorney to be faithful
to the interests of his client.:" Usually the client knows little or
nothing about procedure. The attorney does not act under the
direction of his client, but having been given authority he acts
according to his own knowledge and judgment as an officer of the
court. Hence it seems to be well settled that the negligence of an
attorney is not imputable to the client where the attorney is acting
within his professional capacity and where the client himself has
exercised ordinary care.' 2  However, the mere employment of an
attorney does not excuse a party from giving the suit his personal
attention. 13
It has been held that the neglect was not excusable where the
defendants changed their address and did not receive the answer
which their counsel sent them until eleven months after it was
mailed,' 4 where defendants were old and feeble and forgot about
'Lumber Co. v. Blue (1915) 170 N. C. 1, 86 S. E. 724.
"Bank v. Brock (1917) 174 N. C. 547, 94 S. E. 301.
'Gallns v. Ins. Co. (1917) 174 N. C. 553, 94 S. E. 300; Duffer v. Brunson
(1924) 188 N. C. 789, 125 S. E. 619.
1 0Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co. (1916) 172 N. C. 320, 92 S. E. 41.
Arrington v. Arrington (1895) 116 N. C. 170, 21 S. E. 181.
Gaylord v. Berry (1915) 169 N. C. 733, 86 S. E. 623; Lumber Co. v. Par-
sons (1916) 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241; Holland v. Benevolent Asso. (1918)
176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150; Stallings v. Spruill (1918) 176 N. C. 120, 96 S. E.
890.
'Pepper v. Clegg (1903) 132 N. C. 312, 43 S. E. 906; also note 10 supra." Vick v. Baker (1898) 122 N. C. 98, 29 S. E. 64.
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the service of summons,15 where there was mere forgetfulness due
to one giving his attention to more important matters,16 where the
client (a physician) knew that his attorney was ill and under his
care when court convened,17 and where the mistake was one of law
rather than of fact.1 s But in the instant case where the defendant
knew nothing about its attorney's handicaps and knew that the
attorney was a man of high character and well known for his pro-
fessional integrity, it cannot be said that it did not act as a reasonably
prudent person in assuming that the attorney would advise it when
and what steps to take in making its defense.
It was not necessary to decide in the instant case whether the
attorney's neglect was excusable or whether he breached a duty
which he owed to the client. To say that the attorney did not, under
the circumstances, act as a reasonably prudent man would be a very
doubtful assertion.
C. W. HALL.
TAXATION-FILING FALSE INCOME TAX RETURN-PROFITS FROM
BOOTLEGGING As INCOME-In Steinberg v. U. S. (1926) 14 Fed.
(2d) 564, the defendant was indicted, tried and convicted on two
counts charging that he filed a false and fraudulent income tax
return' for the calendar year 1921, and that he committed perjury
in swearing to the same return.2 The evidence showed that his
wrongdoing consisted in having obtained profits from the sale of
liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act, and then return-
ing as his sole income his salary of $10,000 as an officer of a corpora-
"Pierce v. Eller (1914) 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758.
" Note 7, supra.
"THolland v. Benevolent Asso. (1918) 176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150.
'Lerch v. McKinne (1924) 187 N. C. 419, 122 S. E. 9.
I Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, s. 6336 1/8 v.: Any individual . . . who
wilfully refuses . . . to make such return . . . or who wilfully at-
tempts in any manner to defeat or evade the tax imposed . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
2 Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, s. 6336 1/8 kk: Individuals "shall each make
under oath a return stating specifically the items of his gross income and the
deductions and credits allowed."
Crim. Cod, s. 125: Whoever, having taken an oath . . . in any case in
which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, . . .
that any . . . declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is
true, shall wilfully and contrary to such oath state or subscribe any material
matter which he does not believe to -be true, is guilty of perjury.
Sec. 335, Comp. St. s. 10509: This offense is a felony.
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tion. In fact, his net income was $760,635.43. However, the
judgment was reversed because certain evidence was erroneously
admitted.
But as to the first count, the court, speaking through Hough,
Circuit Judge, said:
"That the winnings of a professional gambler, the loot of a
burglar, the bribes of a dishonest official, the wages of a prostitute,
or the profits of any criminal commerce should not be regarded as
income, but should for reasons of public policy be regarded as
beneath the contempt of the law, is a proposition not without
attraction.
"It is true that a distinction may be drawn between the profits
of an embezzlement, a robbery, and a burglary, and those of sales of
liquor, or plumes of birds of paradise, both of which are at present
under rather similar bans; but there remains a long list of unlawful
and profitable occupations in which the proprietor has that legal title
to his illegal profits which the thief has not.
The judge then says that if Congress can extend the phrase
"intoxicating liquors" so as to cover beverages confessedly not in-
toxicating, "it can assuredly extend the meaning of the word
'income' to cover items beyond the definition of any dictionary.
. . . This has been done.8  . . We have no doubt that
Congress meant to levy a contribution upon every species of gain,
no matter how immoral or vicious the method of acquiring the same
might be."
The court proceeds: "The whole matter is covered by one re-
mark of Holmes, J., in U. S. v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477: 'Of course
Congress may tax wbat it also forbids.' . . . And equally it is
of course, that, if the Legislature can tax the liquor which it for-
bids, it may also tax the gains made by dealing in that which is
forbidden."
Steinberg was indicted in order to be punished severely for deal-
ing largely in liquor, and, the court continued, "the question is not
whether this is wise or politic, fair or in good taste, but whether it
can legally be done. We think it can under the language of the
"Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, s. 6338 1/8 if, declares that "gross income"
shall include "gains, profits and income derived from . . professions,
vocations, trades, businesses, commerce or sales . . . or the transaction of
any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits derived from any
source whatever."
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statutes, and know that similar things have been done for genera-
tions." [Citing instances and authorities].
Circuit Judge Manton, concurring in the result, thinks that the
judgment should be reversed, and also the indictment dismissed.
because no breach of the perjury statute is established. He says:
"In the case of criminal gains, a taxpayer may refuse to incrimi-
nate himself, and the government is powerless in securing the de-
tailed information of his return.4 If the recipient of this kind of
income is obliged to make known its amount and the source, when
it is received in sufficient sums to be beyond the exempt minimum,
he is compelled to state under oath information that he is not obliged
to give, if he chooses to exercise his right of protection . ..
"It is hard to conceive of Congress ever having had in mind that
the government be paid a part of the income, gains, or profits
derived from successfully carrying on this crime, or entering into
a combination with the person engaged in this unlawful business to
ascertain how and to what extent he shall be taxed . ..
"The courts of Canada . . . have held that its Parliament
never intended to levy income tax on the proceeds of crime or gain
derived from the business which cannot be carried on without
violating its criminal law."
HILL YAIRBOROUGH.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD OF CAM OWED BY PULLMAN
COMPANY-In Forbes v. Pullman Co., et al (1926, S. C.) 135 S. E.
563 the plaintiff, an aged lady passenger entered a dimly lighted pull-
man coach-customary for that hour of the day-about 6:00 A.M.,
and while walking down the aisle stumbled over a suitcase and fell,
receiving serious injuries. She brought an action for damages due
'Citing U. S. Const., Amend. V, "No. person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... "
Meaning, said Judge Manton, "that a person shall not be compelled, when
acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony that might tend to
show that he had committed a crime."
This view has been followed in Sullivan v. U. S. (1926) 15 F. (2d) 809,
where it was held that, while Congress had power and, by the Revenue Act,
manifested an intention to tax income derived from criminal transactions, as
unlawful sales of liquor, the privilege against self-incrimination (5th. Amend.)
furnished a complete defense to an indictment charging failure to file an income
tax return when the return, if filed, would disclose that income was earned in
criminal transactions.
See discussion of the Steinberg and Sullivan cases in 5 Texas L. Rev. 207;
see also 11 Minn. L. Rev. 385 and 25 Mich. L. Rev. 470.
